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Today's Operational Challenge:
Defining Victory in Operations Short of War

by

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Operations short of war, which are often dangerous and challenging, are a big concern for today's Armed Forces. Also important is the study of operational art. The linkage between these two concepts, not yet fully developed, is critical. Defining victory, perhaps the most complex problem with the linkage, is the subject of this study.

This analysis centers on the three essential questions of operational art in FM 100-5, Operations. These questions define victory for the operational commander. They are: (1) What military conditions must be produced in the theater of war or theater of operations to achieve the strategic goal? (2) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (3) How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?

The questions are probed using the strategic-operational, military-civilian and operational tactical interfaces. These affect the definition of victory in operations short of war.

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Each interface is analyzed considering its effect on the questions mentioned above. The paper is conceptual. No specific campaign is studied, but a variety of examples from recent operations short of war such as Vietnam, the Iran hostage rescue mission, the Grenada operation, the raid in Libya and current operations in the Persian Gulf and NATO provide insights for the analysis.

This monograph examines the complexity of operations short of war. This complexity leads to two deductions. First, actions in theaters of operations short of war qualify as operational art. Second, doctrine is inadequate in addressing the complexities these operations entail. The monograph also finds that the military-civilian interface is critical to sucess in these operations. Like it or not, operational commanders in operations short of war must understand and cope with policy; policy-makers and the media. Preparing commanders for this role requires emphasis.

In the end, this study concludes that victory for an operational commander in a theater of war can be defined by answering the three essential questions of operational art. The paper provides insights and conclusions about the topic, but is only a start for future analysis. Winning in operations short of war is a complex, sophisticated business. Futher study will clearly explain how it is consistently achieved.

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
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
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
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
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ABSTRACT

TODAY'S OPERATIONAL CHALLENGE: DEFINING VICTORY IN OPERATIONS
SHORT OF WAR by MAJ Walter Wojdakowski, USA, 46 pages.

Operations short of war, which are often dangerous and
challenging, are a big concern for today's Armed Forces. Also
important is the study of operational art. The linkage between
these two concepts, not yet fully developed, is critical.
Defining victory, perhaps the most complex problem with the
linkage, is the subject of this study.

This analysis centers on the three essential questions of
operational art in FM 100-5, Operations. These questions
define victory for the operational commander. They are:

(1) What military condition must be produced in the
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strategic goal? (2) What sequence of actions is most
likely to produce that condition? (3) How should the
resources of the force be applied to accomplish that
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The questions are probed using the strategic-operational,
military-civilian and operational-tactical interfaces. These
affect the definition of victory in operations short of war.
Each interface is analyzed considering its affect on the
questions mentioned above. The paper is conceptual. No
specific campaign is studied, but a variety of examples from
recent operations short of war such as Vietnam, the Iran
hostage rescue mission, the Grenada operation, the raid in
Libya and current operations in the Persian Gulf and NATO
provide insights for the analysis.

This monograph examines the complexity of operations short
of war. This complexity leads to two deductions. First,
actions in theaters of operations short of war qualify as
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finds that the military-civilian interface is critical to
success in these operations. Like it or not, operational
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with policy, policy-makers and the media. Preparing commanders
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In the end, this study concludes that victory for an
operational commander in a theater short of war can be defined
by answering the three essential questions of operational art.
The paper provides insights and conclusions about the topic,
but is only a start point for future analysis. Winning in
operations short of war is a complex, sophisticated business.
Further study will clearly explain how it is consistently
achieved.

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I. INTRODUCTION

> Military operations short of war are serious, tough,
> challenging, dirty, and dangerous. But they are also
> important. Our national security depends on our
> success.[1]

The conduct of operations short of war is perhaps the most

challenging task facing today's U.S. Armed Forces. Since World

War II, every use of military force by the United States has

occurred in a theater of undeclared war. In fact, our nation

has declared war only five times in its history.[2] Despite this

propensity for involvement in operations short of war,

developing clear doctrine and organized thought on the subject

remains in its infancy.

Today the U.S. faces a low probability of high-intensity

war. The consequences of high-intensity war are too terrible

to imagine. Hence, the probability that this war will ever

occur is low. Our nation increasingly faces threats to its

"vital interests" from lesser powers. These confrontations,

much less risky for all parties involved, are likely to

continue in the future. For the purpose of this paper,

confrontations short of declared war involving the employment

of military power to protect the "vital interests" are

considered operations short of war.

The renewed focus on operational art in warfighting is as

important as the concern about operations short of war.

Operational art is defined by FM 100-5, Operations, as "the

employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a

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theater of war or theater of operations through the design,
organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations."[3]
It is also popularly accepted in a more simple form.
"Determining when and where to fight so a tactical victory has
a strategic result is the operational art."[4] Both these
definitions link tactical actions to accomplishing strategic
goals. This linkage, accomplished by operational art, is a
crucial element for the analysis conducted in this paper.

The meshing of operational art with operations short of
war requires original thinking. Operational artists in
theaters short of war often face more complex problems than
those in theaters of total war. Defining victory, perhaps the
most complex problem they face, is the focus of this study.

As the Principle of War The Objective suggests, military
leaders must "direct every military operation towards a clearly
defined, decisive and attainable objective."[5] In an
operational theater short of war The Objective is difficult to
surmise. As Clausewitz said,

> No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses
> ought to do so--without first being clear in his mind
> what he intends to achieve by that war and how he
> intends to conduct it. The former is its political
> purpose; the latter its operational objective [6]

To Clausewitz the definition of victory was decided upon before
hostilities began. The premise of the Principle of War The
Objective is the same as Clausewitz' premise. The problem in
operations short of war is that the ability to decide
beforehand what to achieve is not a simple task.

Defining victory in operations short of war is linked to The Objective.[7] It also hinges on the answer to the three questions posed in FM 100-5, Operations, when reducing the operational art to its essentials. These three questions define victory for the operational commander. They are:

> (1) What military condition must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal?
> (2) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition?
> (3) How should the resources of the force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?[8]

By answering these three questions the operational commander defines victory in the theater. This paper will analyze several aspects of these questions in an attempt to provide some answers which pertain to operations short of war.

The procedure used for the analysis is straightforward. It begins with a discussion of the first essential question of operational art as it pertains to a military operation short of war. The question is probed using three aspects of operational art for analysis--the strategic-operat'onal, military-civilian, and operat'onal-tactical interfaces. Various examples from recent operations highlight the difficulties in defining the end prior to committing the means.

The discussion of the first question is followed by an analysis of barriers which complicate the conduct of limited operations. That is, many complications arise when answering the second two essential questions of operational art. Again, the same three aspects provide a tool for analysis and various

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examples highlight the complexity of conducting these operations.

Finally, some conclusions are drawn. These conclusions provide insights into the difficulties faced by operational commanders in today's theaters. Clarification of the essentials of operational art will be helpful for tomorrow's operational commanders.

Victory in operations short of war is yet to be defined properly. Certainly, its definition may differ from classic definitions of success in total war. These, too often, orient toward total destruction of the enemy armed forces. Perhaps no clear definition of victory is possible--perhaps some parameters exist which will clarify the definition. The problem facing operational commanders when defining victory in the context of operations short of war is a difficult one. Analysis of the three essential questions of operational art is a good place to start the clarification process.

II. SETTING OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES: THE ENDS

What military condition must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal?

Deciding on the objective is the first important step in any military operation. In an operation short of war this step has no less significance. As outlined above, this first step can be best characterized by the question--what military condition must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal? For commanders in theaters

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where war is undeclared, yet where military operations occur, the answer to this question becomes exceedingly complex. This section of the analysis focuses on the difficulties in answering this first question. Several aspects will be explored. This will clarify the operational commander's role in deciding on an appropriate objective.

First, there is the problem of clear direction from above. This problem, essentially one of strategy formulation, makes decisions about military conditions extremely difficult. Operations in Vietnam, along with other current examples, highlight the difficulty this problem creates. Second, problems of the military-civilian interface at the operational level are endemic to this kind of operation. This second problem, a result of extensive civilian political influence in a theater, complicates the commander's ability to set military objectives. Finally, operations short of war have a unique effect on the operational-tactical interface. This interface in an operation short of war defines a new set of parameters for setting realistic objectives. Together, these three aspects clearly outline the dilemma facing operational commanders. Setting appropriate objectives in an operation short of war is a complicated business. Some insights into this complexity should prove beneficial.

A. THE STRATEGIC-OPERATIONAL INTERFACE

Clear direction from above is critical to operational art.

This direction, classified as military strategy, is defined as "the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation or alliance to secure policy objectives by the application or threat of force. It establishes goals in theaters of war and theaters of operations."[10] In today's operations short of war strategy formulation takes on a complexity never before experienced. This complexity requires operational commanders to interact constantly with strategists when planning and conducting campaigns.[11] "It is this interaction that makes strategy the key to the operational level of war."[12]

Operations in Vietnam provide the most revealing examples of the problem of strategy formulation. The impact of this problem upon the operational commander's ability to set military objectives is graphic. Although Vietnam involved large U.S. forces employed in combat roles for an extended period, it was fought with limited means and without a formal declaration from Congress. It qualifies as an operation short of war and provides an excellent model for analyzing the strategic-operational interface. It reveals a surprising number of insights that remain relevant today in operations short of war.

One striking lesson from Vietnam concerning military strategy is critical; winning tactical battles does not guarantee success--especially in a theater where military forces are not committed to total victory. Without the operational interface linking victorious tactical battles to operational objectives that lead to a strategic goal, victory

is often impossible.

The United States won virtually every tactical battle in Vietnam, but failed to accomplish its strategic goal. Failure to develop a coherent strategy for victory caused the defeat.[13] Failures at the operational level also contributed to the defeat. The poor interaction between strategists and operational artists led to an imbalance between strategic goals and the available resources. Consequently, the strategic goals were not achieved.

Strategic guidance is a critical link between the highest levels of government and the operational commander's ability to set objectives. However, this strategic guidance and its link to the operational level is difficult in an operation short of war. A brief analysis of this difficulty clarifies the operational commander's place in the strategic-operational interface.

Limited goals are the main factor complicating strategic guidance in an operation short of war. Setting strategic goals, difficult in any context, is even more challenging in these operations. The blending of ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources) at the strategic level has always been a difficult process.[14] In World War II, America's last declared war, strategic finesse did not guide Eisenhower's campaign in Europe. The Allied Chiefs of Staff directed him to "enter the continent of Europe, and...undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces."[15] This directive, although not particularly eloquent,

has the advantage of total commitment. It gave Eisenhower access to all available resources of the allied nations (except, of course, those allocated to the Pacific Theater), it gave him the greatest possible freedom of action and it was straightforward in its concept--destroy the German armed forces. It was certainly consistent with the Principle of War The Objective. Eisenhower could direct all military efforts toward a "clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective."[16]

On the other hand, the strategic guidance provided General Westmoreland, Commander, Military Assistance Command - Vietnam (MACV), was different. A survey of his book, A Soldier Reports, indicates poorly conceived strategic guidance. The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam, by General (Ret) Bruce Palmer, Westmoreland's Deputy in Vietnam, along with Colonel Harry Summers' book On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, provide convincing arguments about the unclear strategic guidance.[17] As a result, the objective for MACV was "to assist the Government of Vietnam and its armed forces to defeat externally directed and supported communist subversion and aggression and attain an independent South Vietnam functioning in a secure environment."[18] This objective, although quite eloquent, is not blessed with the advantage of total commitment. In fact, as Colonel Summers has correctly pointed out, this objective is grossly inconsistent with the Principle of War The Objective.[19]

The dilemma highlighted by Vietnam is that the destruction

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of the enemy is not necessarily the required military condition. Something more limited is the desired end. This limited commitment is characteristic of all operations short of war. Consequently, the strategist faces a host of other choices when attempting to blend ends, means and ways.

A limited commitment may cause an incoherent strategy. This requires operational commanders to play a much greater role in strategy formulation. They become strategists themselves. They must truly understand the available strategic choices and interact with the strategist throughout the process of objective-setting. Then, once the limited strategic goal is set, the operational artist must devise an acceptable operational objective. These are not easy tasks. In Vietnam, the operational commanders failed to accomplish these tasks. This failure caused the downfall of the U.S. in the conflict. In today's operations where direct military combat is less apparent than in Vietnam, the task of objective-setting is just as critical.

Henry Kissinger has aptly pointed out the problem in strategy formulation. He appreciates the difficulty in today's world with setting strategic goals which can be translated into military conditions. He says,

> In the past, the major problem of strategists was
> to assemble superior strength; in the contemporary
> period, the problem more frequently is how to
> discipline the available power into some relationship
> to the objectives likely to be in dispute.

This problem is at the heart of operations short of war. With

limited power available, limited strategic goals ensue.
Translating these into military objectives which satisfy the
Principle of War The Objective is essential, but hard to
accomplish.

Clear direction from above, critical for any operational
commander in the process of setting military objectives, is
difficult to achieve in operations short of war. The burden is
on operational commanders to interact with those above to help
solve this dilemma. Without the appropriate interaction, the
military condition required to achieve the strategic goal is
impossible to ascertain. Such interaction requires more highly
skilled operational commanders than ever before.

B. THE MILITARY-CIVILIAN INTERFACE

The military-civilian interface is the second aspect of
operations short of war which complicates the question of
objectives. The problem with this interface also arises from
the limited strategic goals already discussed. When the
commitment of military force is not total, the impact of
civilian political control will be great. For the operational
commander, the answer to the question concerning what military
condition is required to achieve the strategic goal is almost
irrelevant; civilian conditions often take precedence.

The MACV objective, once again, highlights some problems
in this realm. As mentioned, the objective was "to assist the
Government of Vietnam and its armed forces to defeat externally

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directed and supported communist subversion and aggression and
attain an independent South Vietnam functioning in a secure
environment."[21] Various aspects of this objective show the
political impact on the theater mission. They also highlight
the problems a commander in any operation short of war will
face in the future.

First, the beginning of the objective says "to assist the
Government of Vietnam." This is clearly a political mission.
General Westmoreland, MACV commander from 1965-1968, realized
this. He dealt extensively with the Ambassador and with the
political leaders of the South Vietnamese Government in his
prosecution of the war.[22] Likewise, General Creighton Abrams,
MACV commander from 1968-1972, pursued the war under close
scrutiny from civilian leadership, both in South Vietnam and
from leaders at home.[23] Both commanders spent considerable
effort assisting a foreign government. Considering this fact,
it is understandable how they failed to set and accomplish a
purely military operational objective. The strategic goal "to
assist the Government of South Vietnam," confused the
operational objective.

Secondly, the portion of the objective "to attain an
independent South Vietnam functioning in a secure environment,"
is certainly more of a political objective than a military
one.[24] It is no small wonder that the focus of the commanders
in Vietnam was not solely on a military condition required to
accomplish a strategic goal--political conditions took
precedence.

The Vietnam example is instructive in analyzing the military-civilian interface. In any operation short of war the operational commander will struggle to find a purely military solution. In fact, if he seeks one he misses the point. Military forces are actually in support of "main efforts" by non-military entities in most cases. The commander confronts a host of civilian concerns which prevent him from focusing on military objectives. Any military consideration is subordinate to conditions dictated by the political situation. This should not be a surprise, as even in total war the military is subordinate to political leadership. But, the more limited the war, the more difficult it is to separate military conditions from political, economic, social, and other conditions.

The military-civilian interface is a critical factor in an operation short of war. This interface determines the commander's ability to predict military conditions necessary for victory. According to the National Security Strategy of the United States, 1987, the primary instrument used to conduct operations short of war is through the security assistance program. This program subordinates the U.S. Armed Forces in operations short of war to the control of the State Department.[25] Such a relationship surely forces operational commanders to consider the military-civilian interface in the theater in a new light. Perhaps the question to answer is not what military condition must be produced to achieve the strategic goal, but what political and/or civilian condition must be produced?

C. THE OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL INTERFACE

The final aspect complicating the question of objectives is tied to tactics. The operational-tactical interface defines a new set of parameters for setting objectives. The "art by which....unit commanders translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements"[26] is almost a misnomer in the context of operations short of war. Tactical leaders will seldom employ the classic elements of combat power--maneuver, firepower, protection, leadership. They will most likely employ elements such as security assistance, humanitarian aid, mobile training teams, military intelligence assets and civil affairs teams. Despite this, operational commanders retain the responsibility for linking these tactical operations together to accomplish strategic goals. Obviously, this requires a changed outlook on how the "campaign" is designed. The campaign objectives surely must reflect this changed outlook.

The recently completed Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy entitled Discriminate Deterrence, accurately assesses some of the new tactical weapons needed in an operation short of war. It predicts,

> We also need to think of low intensity conflict as a
> form of warfare that is not a problem just for the
> Department of Defense. In many situations, the United
> States will need not just DOD personnel and materiel,
> but diplomats and information specialists, agricultural
> chemists, bankers and economists, hydrologists,
> criminologists, meteorologists, and scores of other
> professionals.[27]

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The impact of the changes noted above on the objectives of the "campaign" is decisive. It forces theater commanders to devise military objectives which complement various other objectives to reach a different type of strategic goal.

New doctrinal insights must address the operational-tactical interface in operations short of war. As MG Gordon Sullivan, Deputy Commandant of the Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas recently wrote,

> We must....determine how operations short of war relate to our traditional role of warfighting.....We must define the concept and develop a doctrinal structure that clearly delineates the relationship between traditional war and activities short of war.

Nowhere is the relationship between traditional war and activities short of war more divergent than at the operational-tactical interface. Discovering how to link new tactical innovations together to accomplish strategic goals in an operation short of war requires fundamental changes. These changes impact on the writing of both operational and tactical doctrine. Without changes, determining operational objectives will remain difficult. When destruction of the enemy armed forces is the sole concern, current doctrine is adequate. For operations short of war, the parameters have changed; doctrine must change to accommodate these new parameters.

D. INSIGHTS: THE ENDS

The first essential question of the operational art

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concerns the objective. In the context of operations short of
war, three different perspectives prove meaningful. All three
provide insights into changes faced by operational commanders
in the future. Since operations short of war are most
probable, these insights deserve attention.

First, the strategic-operational interface creates a
dilemma for both the strategist and operational artist.
Strategy in pursuit of limited goals is complex and difficult.
Yet, without proper direction from above, operations have
little chance of success. The operational commander must
carefully describe theater objectives in his desire to produce
the military condition which will achieve the strategic goal.
He cannot do this without a clear strategic goal. His
responsibility in today's operations is greatly expanded. It
includes a great influence on strategy formulation and
continuous interaction at the strategic level. Without this
interaction the operational commander cannot ensure that an
achievable strategic goal is set in the theater. This requires
great skill; operational-level commanders need that skill.

Second, the military-civilian interface in operations
short of war plays a major part in determining theater
objectives. As the objective in Vietnam so aptly shows, when
the primary goal is not the destruction of the enemy force, the
substitution of other objectives occurs. In fact, as the use
of military force is limited, the importance of civilian
conditions increases. In many cases, no military condition
produces an achievable strategic goal; instead, a political or

civilian condition is most important. This changes the goal of operational art. Finding a purely military condition that achieves a strategic goal may be impossible in operations short of war. This significantly alters the first essential question of the operational art.

Finally, the operational-tactical interface in operations short of war complicates the question of objectives. Tactics in modern theaters differ from the past. Classical forms of combat power may be needed, but it is far more likely that other forms will be necessary. The other forms may be effective, but are often more difficult to administer; at least they are much less understood than the classic forms. Linking such elements as security assistance and humanitarian aid together to accomplish strategic goals remains the operational commander's responsibility. He provides direction in the form of clear objectives; he links objectives together to accomplish strategic goals. This remains his greatest challenge. Doctrine to accommodate the new parameters of an operation short of war will greatly simplify the task.

Defining victory begins with the first essential question of operational art. Answering this question with a different focus is the first step in defining victory. Skill at the strategic level, diversity in thought as to conditions for success, and a different outlook and doctrine to accommodate new tactical parameters available will all lead toward success in this first step.

III. ACCOMPLISHING THE OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVE: WAYS AND MEANS

> What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that
> condition? How should the resources of the force be
> applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?

Deciding how to accomplish the chosen operational

objective is the second major step in any military operation.

Once again, this step is essential in operations short of war.

In light of the problems with the first essential step

discussed so far, this second step also presents great

difficulty in the context of operations short of war.

This section of the analysis explores problems with

executing operations. The same three aspects discussed earlier

will be used for analysis--the strategic-operational, military-

civilian, and operational-tactical interfaces. The analysis

highlights the significant execution problems which exist for

commanders in operations short of war. By highlighting these

problems, insights into dealing with objective accomplishment

should come to light. These insights will help clarify how

operational commanders define victory in operations short of

war.

A. THE STRATEGIC-OPERATIONAL INTERFACE

The strategic-operational interface has a major impact on

objective accomplishment. This impact results from the same

limited strategic goals already discussed in the first portion

of this paper. As General (Ret) Bruce Palmer, former deputy

commander of MACV once said,

> Limited war, that is, war fought with limited
> objectives, or within limited territorial boundaries,
> or with the commitment of only limited resources—is in
> many ways more difficult to conduct than an all-out
> effort....although important interests are involved,
> they do not warrant the employment of all available
> military forces.[30] (Emphasis added)

This section focuses on some of the reasons why General Palmer felt this way. Limited war, in many respects, is more difficult to conduct than all-out war. This complicates the operational commander's ability to achieve victory.

The first difficult problem for the operational commander is the interaction required at the strategic level. Interaction not only pertains to objective-setting, but is essential during execution of the chosen objective. This subject must be remembered in all phases of execution of the operational plan.

Deterrence is the other strategic-operational difficulty encountered during execution. This dominant theme poses major execution problems. It complicates the strategic-operational interface. In operations short of war operational commanders "fight" campaigns designed to avoid wars, not win them. The reason for this, of course, is that the strategic risks once war is started are too great to accept.

Deterrence affects virtually every operation conducted in the "vital interests" of the United States. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons within the two superpowers' arsenals, strategic actions always consider the threat of

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nuclear confrontation. This poses a problem for operational

commanders in every part of the world.

Deterrence is certainly not a new concept. Clausewitz

said,

> Combat is the only effective force in war; its aim is
> to destroy the enemy's forces as a means to a further
> end. That holds good even if no actual fighting
> occurs, because the outcome rests on the assumption
> that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be
> destroyed....All action is undertaken in the belief
> that if the ultimate test of arms should actually
> occur, the outcome would be favorable.[31] (Emphasis
> added)

Clausewitz obviously realized that the threat of destruction of

an enemy force could be used to impose one's will upon that

enemy. The current concept of deterrence is similar. After

all, the first National Security Objective of the United States

is,

> Safeguard the United States and its forces, allies, and
> interests by deterring aggression and coercion; and
> should deterrence fail, by defeating the armed
> aggression and ending the conflict on terms favorable
> to the United States, our allies, and our interests at
> the lowest possible level of hostilities.[32] (Emphasis
> added)

The U.S. threatens the destruction of the enemy force (and

perhaps the world as we know it) in order to impose its will

(the avoidance of war) upon the enemy. Still, stating the

concept of deterrence is one thing, executing it at the

operational level another.

The concept of deterrence greatly alters the conduct of

operations in theaters short of war. The best example of this

is in NATO. By the definition outlined earlier in this paper, the NATO theater is a major operation short of war. It remains the first priority for the U.S. Armed Forces and receives more attention than any other theater. Conducting operations in NATO demands emphasis on deterrence. When sequencing actions and using resources in the theater, the commander keeps one paramount objective in mind; avoid war. His sole purpose for commanding forces is first, to present a credible deterrence to the enemy and then, to fight the enemy should deterrence fail.

Since deterrence is so important, complications arise in the theater. On the one hand, the commander must prepare forces for warfighting. On the other hand, he cannot assemble such a powerful force that the enemy will feel threatened and begin a war. He must also avoid presenting such conventional strength that nuclear war is seen as unlikely. This reduces nuclear deterrence and may cause war. For that matter, he cannot prepare his forces too little for fear the enemy will take advantage of the weakness and begin a war. In any case, the commander has failed in his primary objective; avoid war. Should deterrence fail, he has a new objective; fight the war and win. This will measure how well he accomplished the first task, namely the preparation of his forces for warfighting. Despite all this, he ultimately banks on a higher level of deterrence; the threat of nuclear war controlled at the strategic level.

Reconciling these competing interests at the operational level is no small task. It requires a clear understanding of

deterrence and the strategic-operational interface, as well as skillful perceptions of how the enemy is likely to react. Mistakes may be very costly. Operational commanders must possess the understanding and skill to operate effectively in this environment.

Another example of deterrence is the case of operations in the Persian Gulf. In the Gulf, the JTF Commander is an operational commander according to the definition used for this paper. He conducts tactical actions to accomplish strategic goals. He also confronts the same deterrence dilemma faced by all commanders in operations short of war. He avoids confrontation and acts only when a clear and imminent threat to his mission presents itself. Although enough force is available to defeat opponents at sea in the Gulf, he cannot use it because of the possible escalation of the conflict. Any escalation is not in keeping with the U.S. desire to avoid war.

In sum, deterrence is the main reason forces are present in the Gulf. They prevent expansion of the Iran-Iraq war. This prevents interference with the free flow of oil from the region. It also deters the Soviet Union from expanding its presence in the region. This objective follows from the third National Security Objective of the United States: "Ensure U.S. access to critical resources, markets, the oceans, and space."[35] The JTF commander protects U.S. "vital interests" and ultimately deters the Soviet Union from expanding its presence. And, every action taken to fulfill this role considers deterrence as a major factor. The mission is

complex. The JTF commander would be hard-pressed to explain the sequence of actions and application of resources needed to define victory in the theater. The operation is conducted to avoid escalation into war. No clear sequence of actions or application of resources guarantees this.

Clearly, operations such as those highlighted are "in many ways more difficult than in theaters of all-out war."[24] Defining victory in such operations is complex. Deterrence complicates the strategic-operational interface in waging "campaigns" short of war. Too much force leads to war; this is avoided. Not enough force leads to war; this also is avoided. Any use of force may escalate into nuclear confrontation; this is avoided at all costs. Yet, if war occurs, victory must be achieved. Somewhere amongst these complications is the right amount of force; skilled operational commanders find this right amount. They also convince strategists that this is the right amount to accomplish the strategic goals in the theater. Only then can they execute the "campaign" with a legitimate chance for victory.

B. THE MILITARY-CIVILIAN INTERFACE

The military-civilian interface is the second aspect of importance in the context of accomplishing operational objectives. This aspect complicates the operational commander's job in the execution of his "campaign". These complications cause unity of command problems and media

problems during execution in theaters short of war. A brief analysis of these two problems will highlight their importance in the search for victory.

The first important concern, unity of command, plagues operations short of war. One obvious part of this concern is the joint and combined nature of modern operations; this concern is well-documented and continuously evaluated. It will not be explored in this paper. The impact of direct civilian influence in the day-to-day decision-making of military leaders is explored. This impact, one which reached fruition in Vietnam, continues to complicate the operational commander's conduct of operations short of war.

Close supervision and direct influence from civilian leadership in modern "campaigns" is potentially devastating, yet it is an inevitable fact of life for today's commanders. Clearly, the days of allowing military experts to run the war are over. Baron Antoine Jomini's principle that policy makers make the policy and then turn the war over to the military commander for execution is no longer valid.[36] This principle recently lost much of its appeal. The loss of face suffered by the military during Vietnam contributed to the loss of confidence. Problems encountered during the Iran hostage rescue mission tainted the civilian leadership's perspective on military expertise. The bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut added to the misgivings. The mistakes made during the Grenada raid also fueled civilian concerns.[37] As a result, today's civilian leaders tend to exert direct influence on

military decision-making. This influence undermines the military chain of command and may adversely affect operations.

In Vietnam, President Johnson directed targeting in the North because he did not trust his military leaders.[37] On the day of the evacuation of the U.S. embassy in Vietnam, the White House knew the tail numbers of the helicopters being used. Certainly, direct influence in the execution of operations short of war occurred during operations in Vietnam. It is a distinct possibility in today's world and is liable to continue in the future.

Two items cause America's civilian leaders to influence military operations directly; concern for the loss of human life and the access afforded due to the technology of modern communications. Both these items flourish in limited operations. First, since war is not declared, the loss of even one human life is less acceptable and harder to justify. The legacy of Vietnam still exists; fifty thousand (50,000) American lives were lost in an undeclared war. Neither the American people nor Congress declared their direct support through mobilization or a formal declaration of war. Since then, similar operations have resulted in the loss of soldiers' lives. No doubt, these facts profoundly influence the military-civilian interface.

Second, the access afforded by modern communications allows civilian leaders to influence directly the number of lives placed at risk. The leaders of the Iran rescue mission talked directly to the White House from Desert One when

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considering their options.[36] The President of the United
States could talk directly to the ground commander on the
island of Grenada. Right now in the Persian Gulf, the nation's
highest civilian leaders can talk directly to the JTF
commander. This access may prevent military commanders from
exceeding the acceptable level of risk. It also complicates
the military-civilian interface.

Exacerbating the civilian influence problem is the fact
that "it's the only war in town". In a declared war the
civilian leadership faces a host of diplomatic chores and a
myriad of difficult strategic decisions. In an operation short
of war they face only one limited crisis. Further, the enemy
and the international community often perceive that the actions
of the unit are directed by the President. With these
perceptions prevalent and so much at stake, the President
naturally feels obligated to direct the action. Combined, the
effects of these items impacts profoundly on the conduct of the
operation.

When designing and conducting campaigns, when using the
nation's resources to accomplish military objectives, military
leaders can expect direct civilian influence. This is
especially so in an operation short of war because human lives
are at risk and war is not declared. Human resources are not
used lightly. Caspar Weinberger. as Secretary of Defense,
appreciated this. He stipulated in his sixth consideration for
the use of military forces that "military combat forces should
be used only as a last resort."[37] The Congress, by passing the

War Powers Act in 1973, reiterated its concern for using
military combat forces and risking soldiers lives.[40] Congress
uses the War Powers Act to strengthen the guarantee of initial
public support for any war. Congress also perceives the need
to encourage careful consideration before war is declared and
to stifle dissent once the declaration is made.[41]

In operations short of war the possible loss of life
encourages the direct influence of civilian leaders. This
remains a critical consideration for operational commanders.
The access into any level of the chain of command afforded by
today's communications technology also forces operational
commanders to deal with unity of command problems. In
addition, victory may require that no loss of life occurs. In
this environment civilian influence is a daily occurrence.
Prudent operational commanders will accept this fact and
prepare to operate effectively despite it.

The media is the second important concern at the military-
civilian interface. The media continues to influence
operations short of war. This influence also arises from the
same two factors already mentioned, the concern for human life
and the technology of communications. Both these factors force
today's operational commanders to deal with the media as they
execute operational plans.

The influence of media coverage upon military operations
in today's world is well-documented. Two specific concerns
help focus the analysis on the operational level of war. The
first concern is simple. Operational commanders cannot ignore

the media. Although this seems obvious, problems continue to arise in this area. If censorship is decided upon, then the military chain of command bears the burden of providing palatable updates for the press. If the media is given a free reign to cover the operation, then the commander supervises press activity and controls his subordinates to ensure balanced results. In either case, a commander in a theater conducting operations short of war is responsible for the effects of the media. This media problem is intensified when war is not declared. Consequently, failure to recognize the importance of media coverage at the operational level may lead to disaster.

The second concern with respect to the media is in the actual way "campaigns" are conducted. No one can ignore the impact of media coverage upon the way military operations progress in today's world. The media highlights each military error for public consumption. The press corps analyzes every death of an American soldier to ensure that the public realizes why that soldier died. Each statement and action of a military leader is scrutinized to ensure it conforms to national policy. In this atmosphere all strategic, operational and, even in some cases, tactical decisions must take the media into consideration. The influence of this upon operational execution is graphic.

Even in World War II campaigns occurred with an eye for public consumption back home. The campaign in North Africa conducted by the British initially (and later supported by U.S. forces) was needed to gain a victory somewhere for the Allies.

Even as this theater's operations continued, the Allied Powers began planning their key operation, the invasion of Europe to defeat the German Armed Forces.[42] MacArthur's well-publicized return to the Philippines, although operationally important, was partly motivated by the positive public reaction it evoked, both at home and in the Pacific region.[43] These campaigns were not totally essential to military success. They were necessary to fuel public support for the continuation of the war. This is just as important now in operations short of war as it was then in total war.

The media plays a complex, sophisticated part in today's operations and an analysis of this role would be an entire paper in itself. This will be left to others. The critical aspect of media coverage for this analysis is simply stated; every operational commander must consider the media as an important factor in every action taken in an operation short of war.

Just as most of the on-the-scene reporting from Vietnam portrayed true events, the media will continue to report military operations in all their bloody detail. Trying to hide the realities of war is not the answer; the truth ultimately becomes known.[44] We must remember, things worse than war exist. If sound reasons exist for military operations, the media can be encouraged to highlight the importance of the commitment. Positive media coverage will ensue.

Media coverage can be a powerful ally to the operational commander. It can also be more dangerous than the enemy

himself.   In an operation short of war only one simple constant

concerning the media remains--the media and media coverage will

be a factor affecting how the campaign is conducted.   The

prudent operational commander includes this constant when

deciding how to achieve victory in operations short of war.

C. THE OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL INTERFACE

The final important aspect affecting the conduct of

operations short of war concerns the operational-tactical

interface.   As discussed, new tactical parameters exist which

impact on objective-setting.   They involve a host of non-

military activities and redefine the operational commander's

outlook on how to design his "campaign".   These parameters also

involve other direct actions which influence the conduct of

"campaigns".   They are identifiable, discreet, military

activities which involve no combat.   Such items as intelligence

operations, engineering projects, transport tasks and medical

assistance all require consideration and understanding at the

operational-tactical level.   Certainly, these tactical

parameters and those involving the non-DOD tasks outlined

earlier, cannot be forgotten by operational commanders when

sequencing actions and using resources to achieve victory.

In addition to the new tactical parameters involved in

operations short of war, rules of engagement (ROE's) become an

overriding concern at the operational-tactical interface.   A

discussion of this concern should clarify its significance with

respect to campaign execution. It is also an integral part of defining victory in operations short of war.

In essence, all other concerns lead toward rules of engagement. The limited nature of strategic goals, the concept of deterrence, the impact of close political influence and scrutiny, and the inevitability of visible media coverage all combine to dictate constraints upon operational commanders. Certainly, the question of how much force is enough is at the heart of the rules of engagement problem. "Rules of engagement....involve limitations on the direct application of force."[45] This discussion considers the application of force in operations short of war.

Rules of engagement may begin at the highest levels of government, but their impact is felt most at the lowest end of operations. Tactical commanders constantly abide by these rules. Likewise, operational commanders certainly must execute their "campaigns" in consonance with the constraints imposed by ROE's. This significantly affects their operations.

Some rules of engagement from recent operations short of war are well known. The restrictions on ground forces in Vietnam, the bombing restraints self-imposed over North Vietnam, the collateral damage concerns in the Libyan Air Raid and the current restrictions imposed upon forces in the Persian Gulf are examples. These types of ROE's affect the operational-tactical interface in every operation short of war. For all practical purposes, rules of engagement focus on geographical boundaries, weapons limitations, methods of

employing combat power and legal considerations. These categories of ROE's are critical to operational commanders in theaters short of war.[46] A recent example of each should serve to highlight the dilemma facing operational commanders when confronting rules of engagement.

The first example concerns geographical boundaries. Basically, geographic ROE's "limit" the way forces operate. They are designed to control operations short of war and prevent escalation. They are necessary to prevent the possibility of exceeding strategic goals.

The most trying problem in this respect is that different geographic rules exist for different types of forces. The different possible combinations of ROE's for different types of forces is endless. The Navy often enforces an "exclusionary zone" in addition to its sea-going boundaries. Naval air power and submarines quite often operate in their own regions, some within the theater and some outside the theater. Air Force assets usually operate with fewer boundary constraints than ground forces, but various limits to protect civilian populations may occur. Limitations also occur due to basing right restrictions and refueling limitations. In conjunction with all these, ground boundaries imposed for political reasons are a distinct possibility. The maze of geographic rules placed upon the operational commander requires him to understand, articulate, enforce and take advantage of each of the rules of engagement. This is no easy task, but victory can occur only if he is successful.

Weapons limitations also complicate operations short of war. Nuclear weapons control is an obvious example of this type of ROE. Control of nuclear weapons, largely a strategic concern, is adequately addressed in the section on deterrence. A host of other ROE's based upon quantity and quality of weapons in a theater is important for operational commanders. This type of ROE is easily understood, but in today's operations short of war it remains important. Operational commanders who understand the weapons and who properly control their use through rules of engagement will be successful.

The methods of employing combat power also affect the operational-tactical interface. In light of our earlier discussion concerning the use of different forms of combat power, this category of ROE takes on a new complexity. All too often the best way to win militarily is not acceptable within the established ROE's. To define victory when facing this dilemma is a challenge.

Although deterrence is a factor in this dilemma, the contrast between offense and defense is even more critical. The classic ROE in this context concerns not firing on the enemy until he fires first. This ROE makes the "campaign" defensive and forces reactions to the enemy's actions. Various examples illustrate the affects of this upon operations. In Vietnam an offensive into North Vietnam with ground forces was out of the question. The NVA retained the initiative. In the Persian Gulf the best way to protect ships traversing the Straits of Hormuz from Silkworm missiles may be to destroy the

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missile sites. This could end the commitment quickly, save precious resources and lessen the risk of escalation. Unfortunately, this cannot be done since the sites are on Iranian soil. Restrictions on weapons employment will not allow this option. So, we escort every vessel through the straits with a sophisticated (and costly) umbrella of missile defense for protection. In most cases this ROE requires reaction, not action. This concedes the initiative to the enemy, violates a military principle (for war) and causes concern for the operational commander. But, it is exactly what the "principle" of military support in actions short of war requires.

Finally, legal considerations are critical at the operational-tactical interface. Rules governing international waters and air-space, local laws governing the public in the theater, military legal principles which may constrain one side and not the other, and rules specifically governing police and local militia all require consideration. Again, the combinations and possible consequences of these ROE's are endless. Also, these rules must be integrated and coordinated with any ally who is conducting operations in the same theater. Legal considerations undoubtedly influence the conduct of the "campaign" and are particularly significant in an operation short of war. Victory may hinge on the operational commander's ability to understand, articulate, enforce and exploit these rules of engagement.

The foregoing examples outline perfectly the dilemma for

operational commanders in theaters short of war. The new

tactical parameters which exist in these operations complicate

the linking of tactics to strategy. Likewise, rules of

engagement may create inefficiencies in the conduct of military

operations. Limitations imposed upon the direct application of

force in the context of geographical boundaries, weapons

limitations, methods of employing combat power and legal

considerations affect the conduct of operations short of war.

New tactical considerations and ROE's present a complex set of

parameters which must be understood, articulated, enforced and

exploited by the operational commander. They form a key aspect

for consideration when defining victory in an operation short

of war.

D. INSIGHTS: THE WAYS AND MEANS

The second and third essential questions of the

operational art in the context of operations short of war are

important. The same three perspectives used for the analysis

of the first essential question provided the framework for the

analysis of these questions. Once again, insights have arisen

which change the outlook of operational commanders when

executing these operations. A brief synopsis of these is

helpful.

First, the strategic-operational interface requires

continuous interaction during the conduct of operations, just

as it does during objective setting. But even more

importantly, this interface embodies the concept of deterrence and all that it entails. Since deterrence complicates every aspect of waging "campaigns" in an operation short of war, today's operational commanders must fully understand its implications, both at the strategic and operational levels. Sequencing operations and employing resources in order to avoid war is one thing, doing this while still maintaining the readiness necessary to win when war occurs, is another. Balancing these complications, as well as the factor of nuclear deterrence, is an essential element of execution at the operational level. The chances for victory may hinge on this delicate balance.

Second, the military-civilian interface complicates execution of the "campaign" in an operation short of war. Two factors, the direct influence of politicians on the military chain of command and the impact of media coverage on execution of the operation, cause the greatest concern. These factors arise from civilian concerns about the loss of human life in an undeclared war. Further impetus is gained from the easy access into the chain of command afforded by today's communications technology. These factors cannot be ignored in the execution of operations short of war. Victory is only possible if the "campaign" includes consideration for the affects of these factors.

Finally, the operational-tactical interface affects the conduct of operations short of war. This interface includes the consideration of the new tactical parameters and the rules

of engagement. Military tactical activities which do not involve combat have an influence on how "campaigns" are conducted. These, along with non-military tactical tasks, must be remembered as commanders strive for victory. Rules of engagement are also vitally important in this context. ROE's which govern the direct application of force in the context of geographical boundaries, weapons limitations, methods of employing combat power and legal considerations limit the operational and tactical commanders' abilities to conduct efficient military operations. As a result, to gain victory in an operation short of war the operational commander must understand, articulate, enforce and take advantage of the rules of engagement. The degree of complexity this entails further complicates the commander's job.

Defining victory ends with the second two essential questions of the operational art. These two questions define how the operation is conducted. For operations short of war a firm grasp of deterrence, the ability to deal with direct civilian influence through impacts on the chain of command and media coverage, and a clear understanding, articulation, enforcement and exploitation of the new tactical parameters involved and the required rules of engagement afford the operational commander his best chance for victory.

IV. CONCLUSION

(1) What military condition must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal?

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(2) What sequence of actions is most likely to
produce that condition?
(3) How should the resources of the force be
applied to accomplish that sequence of actions?[47]

According to FM 100-5, operational art requires the
commander to answer the three questions outlined above.[48]
Answering these questions requires the commander to identify
the ends, ways and means for the operation. By doing this, he
defines victory in the theater of operations or war. These
essentials framed the analysis for this paper and were used to
clarify the definition of victory in operations short of war.
The ramifications of the analysis are widespread as both
operational art and operations short of war take on new
importance in today's Armed Forces. This provides a good
starting point as doctrine develops for both these important
concepts.

The first oovious conclusion from our analysis is that
operations short of war are extremely complex. This complexity
leads to two very important deductions. First, commanders
executing actions in theaters where operations short of war
exist, qualify as operational commanders. And second, doctrine
is woefully inadequate in addressing the complexities these
operations entail. A brief discussion of each of these
deductions is in order.

The analysis certainly supports the first deduction. By
analyzing the strategic-operational and operational-tactical
interfaces for operations short of war, various insights came
to light. In the discussion of ends and in the analysis of

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ways and means the sophistication required to accomplish
victory became apparent. First, translating strategy into
operational objectives is difficult. Second, executing
strategy with tactical actions to accomplish victory requires
great skill. The thought process necessary for these actions
qualifies as operational art.

Although operations short of war allow a range of military
force commitment from the mere supervision of security
assistance to armed conflict with large combat forces fighting
in an undeclared war, the strategic and tactical results of
each of these is significant. The point is this: someone must
translate strategy into operationally achievable objectives and
then sequence the appropriate amount of military resources to
accomplish the strategic goals in the theater. That someone is
an operational commander. This leads to the next deduction.

Operational doctrine to deal with operations short of war
is inadequate. Deciding on a military condition that will
achieve a strategic goal in total war is one thing, doing it in
an operation short of war is another. Military conditions may
be irrelevant in many operations, even though military force is
exerted. Sequencing actions and applying resources in these
operations entails rules, parameters, and elements of combat
power that are foreign to most military commanders; at least
they lack clarity in our doctrine. No capstone doctrinal
manual like FM 100-5 for operations short of war exists. No
operational framework provides the degree of sophisticated
guidance necessary to deal with the complexities of these

operations.

Regardless of the possibilities concerning how to define an operational commander or how to inculcate operations short of war into doctrine, one fact remains. Operations short of war present difficulties and sophistication at the strategic, operational and tactical levels worthy of great concern. Understanding the difficulties and preparing commanders for the sophisticated nature of these operations is necessary before consistent victories can be expected.

The second conclusion about defining victory in operations short of war is that the military-civilian interface is critical. Like it or not, operational commanders in operations short of war must understand and cope with policy, policy-makers and the media. With the technology of communications today, no commander can isolate himself from the impacts of civilian concerns, either in the setting of objectives or in their execution. In fact, victory will likely be defined by civilian goals which are foreign to classical military theories. "Campaigns" in operations short of war often will be fought for media impact alone; at least for the impact they have on the public. And the public may be local, domestic or international. Defensive, reactionary operations have become the norm; this complicates military execution. Loss of life in these operations is almost forbidden; campaigns must be designed with this in mind. All military actions anywhere in the world are subject to scrutiny by the media and political leaders. Certainly, these facts define a clear role for

operational commanders in dealing at the military-civilian interface. Coping with this new role is not easy; doubtless, preparing commanders for this role requires further attention.

Defining victory in an operation short of war is a complex, sophisticated business. This paper only provides some key insights and several conclusions about the nature of this elusive topic. In the end, victory for an operational commander in a theater short of war can be defined only by answering the three essential questions of the operational art. More work remains to clearly explain how this is done. For military leaders "winning isn't everything, it's the only thing."[49] Discovering how to win in operations short of war requires further study. Confronting the dilemmas outlined in this analysis is a good place to start. Completing the job will not be easy, but it is a necessity. "Our national security depends on our success."[50]

ENDNOTES

[1]Richard H. Taylor, Colonel, US Army, "What Are These Things Called Operations Short of War?" Military Review, January 1988, p. 7.

[2]George J. Church, "Wars Without Declarations," Time, July 6, 1987, p. 38.

[3]Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, May 1986, p. 10.

[4]William S. Lind, "Preparing for Maneuver Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, June 1984, pp. 47-55.

[5]FM 100-5, Operations, p. 173.

[6]Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 579.

[7]FM 100-5, Operations, p. 173.

[8]Ibid., p. 10.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid., p. 2.

[11]David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," Parameters, Spring 1987, p. 65.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Harry G. Summers, Jr., Colonel (Ret), On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1982), p. 59.

[14]Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," p. 43.

[15]United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations, The Supreme Command, p. 53. "cited by" Ronald M. D'Amura, "Campaigns: The Essence of Operational Warfare," Parameters, Summer 1987, p. 43.

[16]FM 100-5, Operations, p. 173.

[17]See William C. Westmoreland, General (Ret), A Soldier Reports, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1976), pp. 174-294; Bruce Palmer, Jr., General (Ret), The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam, (New York: Simon and

Schuster, Inc., 1984), pp. 172-210; Harry G. Summers, Jr., Colonel (Ret), On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1982), pp. 1-32, 111-122. Each of these authors devotes considerable time and effort to the subject of strategic guidance. Collectively, they portray a clear indication of confused, and often unacceptable, guidance from above.

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[19]Harry G. Summers, On Strategy, pp. 59-66.

[20]David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," p. 66.

[21]William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 69.

[22]Ibid., pp. 255-350.

[23]Ibid., pp. 463-464.

[24]Harry G. Summers, On Strategy, p. 64.

[25]Richard H. Taylor, "What Are These Things Called Operations Short of War?" pp. 6-7.

[26]FM 100-5, Operations, p. 10.

[27]Discriminate Deterrence: Report of The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy, by Fred C. Ilke and Albert Wohlstetter, Co-Chairmen (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 15.

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[29]FM 100-5, Operations. p. 10.

[30]Bruce Palmer, The 25-Year War, p. 192.

[31]Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 97.

[32]Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988, by Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 42.

[33]Ibid.

[34]Bruce Palmer, The 25-Year War, p. 192.

[35]Walter Wojdakowski, Major, "Jomini: His Contributions to Modern Military Thought," (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Modern Military Thought Paper, April 1987), p. 4.

[36]See Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant. America's Armed Forces: Triumphs and Failures, (New York: Avon Books, 1987), pp. 5-28, 167-187; Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), pp 3-5.

[37]Arthur T. Hadley, The Straw Giant. p. 174.

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[43]M. Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Phillipines, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1954), p. 2.

[44]Harry G. Summers, On Strategy, p. 25.

[45]Richard A. Burton, Major, "Rules of Engagement: What is the Relationship Between Rules of Engagement and the Design of Operations?" (Fort Leavenworth, KS: SAMS Monograph, 1987), p. 17.

[46]Ibid.

[47]FM 100-5, Operations, p. 10.

[48]Ibid.

[49]Vince Lombardi, Coach, Army Football Team. This quote is attributed to this famous football coach in his earlier days of coaching.

[50]Richard H. Taylor, "What Are These Things Called Operations Short of War?", p. 7.

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